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I
The ‘Apparatus of Capture’ plateau expands and alters the theory of the 
state presented in the third chapter of Anti-Oedipus, while at the same 
time providing a final overview of the sociopolitical philosophy developed 
throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia. It develops a series of challeng-
ing theses about the state, the first and most general of which is a thesis 
against social evolution: the state did not and could not have evolved 
out of ‘primitive’ hunter-gatherer societies. The idea that human societies 
progressively evolve took on perhaps its best-known form in Lewis Henry 
Morgan’s 1877 book, Ancient Society; Or: Researches in the Lines of Human 
Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization (Morgan 1877; 
Carneiro 2003), which had a profound influence on nineteenth-century 
thinkers, especially Marx and Engels. Although the title of the third chap-
ter of Anti-Oedipus – ‘Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men’ – is derived 
from Morgan’s book, the universal history developed in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia is directed against conceptions of linear (or even multilinear) 
social evolution. Deleuze and Guattari are not denying social change, but 
they are arguing that we cannot understand social change unless we see it 
as taking place within a field of coexistence.
Deleuze and Guattari’s second thesis is a correlate of the first: if the 
state does not evolve from other social formations, it is because it creates 
its own conditions (ATP 446). Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the state 
begins with a consideration of the nature of ancient despotic states, such as 
Egypt or Babylon. What was the origin of such empires? And how did they 
acquire their astonishing dominance? Marx proposed a famous answer to 
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the second question: the archaic state is a milieu of interiority that stock-
piles the surplus production of the surrounding agricultural communities, 
constituting a transcendent public power that converges on the person of 
the despot (Marx 1965: 69–70; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 194). In 
the archaic state, primitive codes, with their lineages and territories, are 
allowed to subsist, but they are overcoded by the state and taken up into 
its eminent unity. The despotic state is literally a mega-machine, in Lewis 
Mumford’s terms, in which human beings function as its working parts 
in a kind of ‘generalised enslavement’ (ATP 456–7). The machine is con-
structed like a pyramid, with the agricultural communities at its base, the 
despot at its apex, and a vast bureaucracy in between.
Anti-Oedipus had proposed the term ‘overcoding’ to describe the basic 
mechanism of the archaic mega-machine: the coded filiations and alliances 
of primitive societies are overcoded by a new alliance (of the people with 
the despot) and a direct filiation (of the despot with his deity) (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983: 192, 205). The concept of capture introduced in A 
Thousand Plateaus is meant to provide a more detailed account of the way 
in which overcoding works. The state is a transcendent ‘apparatus of cap-
ture’ that incorporates everything into its form of interiority through three 
primary mechanisms – rent, labour and money – which are a variant of the 
‘trinity formula’ analysed by Marx (Marx 1981: 953), and operate through 
two interrelated operations: direct comparison in the form of abstract quan-
tities, and monopolistic appropriation in the form of stock.
Ground rent. Rent is a mechanism of capture that incorporates land, 
or the ‘earth’, into the state apparatus. But the earth is not a given; if we 
understand the earth as an abstract general space – the geo in geometry, 
and not the more general notion of Earth [terre] sometimes employed by 
Deleuze and Guattari – we must say that this abstract and striated space 
was created by the apparatus of capture. ‘Before’ the earth, the land was 
occupied or territorialised without being measured or divided: there were 
only the shifting territories of primitive societies (or the smooth spaces 
occupied by nomadic societies). The genius of the state, in creating the 
concept of the earth, is to insist that these territories and their occupation 
coexist in a general and abstract space, a space that belongs to the despot. 
In turn, it is the constitution of this indeterminate and abstract space that 
allowed the earth to be divided and portioned out in plots, which were 
distributed to officials whose title to the land was entirely dependent on 
their position in the state bureaucracy. There was no private property: the 
despot was the sole public-property owner, who maintained control over 
his officials through the imposition of rent. Even when agricultural com-
munities were permitted a certain autonomy, they were subordinated to 
the state apparatus through the payment of rent.
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Such is the origin of geo-metry: the constitution of the earth (geo) and 
its measurement and striation (metron) are coexistent. Every year in Egypt, 
after the Nile floods, land surveyors or ‘rope-stretchers’ (hardenonaptai) 
would restriate the land; the Greeks called them, precisely, the ‘measurers 
of the earth’ (geo-meters) (see Serres 1993). The measurement and striation 
of the earth was the condition for the extraction of rent and tribute, since 
rent requires a direct and quantitative comparison of yields to be drawn 
between qualitatively different lands. The worst land bears no rent, but 
it thereby constitutes the lowest element in a cardinal series that allows 
the other soils to produce rent in a comparative way (differential rent). 
Ground rent, as an apparatus of capture, creates the conditions for its own 
operation: rent requires striation, and striation presupposes the earth as a 
general space. But in creating the earth, the state at the same time creates 
the transcendent unity to which the earth is subordinated (the despot). 
States are often seen as territories centred on the palace-temple complex 
of a capital city, but more properly one must say that the state ‘deterrito-
rialises’ the surrounding territories and subordinates them to an imperial 
centre of convergence located outside and beyond them. Ground rent 
is thus an apparatus through which the earth is captured and made the 
object of the state’s higher unity.
Labour. Similarly, human activity is appropriated by the state in the 
form of surplus labour, which is stockpiled in large-scale public works 
projects (pyramids, irrigation projects). The state thus implies a specific 
mode of human activity that does not exist elsewhere: labour. In primitive 
societies, strictly speaking, people do not ‘work’, even if their activities are 
highly constrained and regulated. Deleuze, following Martial Gueroult, 
calls this non-labour mode of activity free action, which is in continuous 
variation: one passes from speech to action, from a given action to another, 
from action to song, from song to speech, from speech to enterprise, ‘all in 
a strange chromaticism with intense but rare peak moments or moments 
of effort’ (ATP 491; Gueroult 1934: 119ff.).
For labour to exist, there must be a capture of such human activity by 
the state apparatus: it is only in the state that activity comes to be com-
pared, linked and subordinated to a common and homogeneous quantity 
called ‘labour’. (This development reached its apex in the nineteenth cen-
tury with Taylorism and Fordism.) For this reason, ‘labour’ and ‘surplus 
labour’ cannot be said to be independent, as if there were first a neces-
sary labour, and then beyond that a surplus labour. Labour and surplus 
labour are strictly the same thing, and all labour implies surplus labour. The 
term ‘labour’ simply applies to the quantitative comparison of activities, a 
striation of the space-time of human activity, while ‘surplus labour’ refers 
to the monopolistic appropriation of labour by the state. The Egyptian 
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pyramids were not constructed by slaves but by conscripted Egyptian 
labour, and as such they constitute a form of stockpiled activity. In other 
words, it is surplus labour that constitutes labour as a new mode of activity 
in the state. There is no labour outside of the state apparatus, and human 
activity is transformed into labour only in relation to the state.
Money. Finally, just as labour does not exist outside the state, neither 
does money. Money was not introduced in order to serve the needs of 
commerce, as if there were first an autonomous domain of ‘markets’ into 
which money was introduced to facilitate exchange (Graeber 2011: 44–5). 
Rather, the converse is the case: money was created by the state to make 
taxation possible. Money, as an abstract equivalent or unit of account, is 
an instrument of measure (metron) that makes possible a direct compari-
son between goods and services, which the state can then appropriate in 
the form of taxes or tribute (Will 1955; Foucault 2013: 133–48; Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983: 197; ATP 442–3). For this reason, it is money that 
creates markets, and not vice-versa: the ‘economy’ presupposes the state. 
As Litaker observes, money striates space-time through the emergence 
of markets, which are spaces of commercial exchange that determine the 
times of production, circulation and consumption (Litaker 2014: 121).
Ground rent, labour and money are the three fundamental aspects of 
the state’s apparatus of capture: ground rent captures the earth, labour 
captures human activity, and money captures exchange. Put differently, 
rent, profit and taxation are three forms of stockpiling, and each of these 
mechanisms converges in the person of the despot, who is at once ‘the emi-
nent landowner, the entrepreneur of large-scale projects, and the master of 
taxes and prices’ (ATP 444). The apparatus of capture has several distinct 
characteristics.
First, and most importantly, the apparatus of capture creates what it cap-
tures. The earth, labour and money are the conditions that make possible 
rent, surplus-labour (profit) and taxes, but these conditions are themselves 
created by the state. This is why ‘capture’ does not simply mean an ‘appro-
priation’ of what already exists; both in fact and in principle, the state is 
only able to capture what it itself creates, or at least what it contributes to 
creating (ATP 446). The state plays the role of a foundation, but it cannot 
play this role if it captures what already exists: if something exists before 
the state, it can exist without the state. For the state to be foundational, 
the state must be self-presupposing (ATP 427), and it is the self-presupposing 
nature of the state that grounds its monopoly power, its triple possession 
in principle of the totality of the earth, the totality of labour and the total-
ity of money. The monopoly power of the state can be expressed philo-
sophically in several ways: in the language of sufficient reason, the state is 
its own ground; in the language of causality, the state is causa sui (Lampert 
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2011: 157); in the language of Kant, the state produces its own conditions of 
possibility (and thus is in itself unconditioned).
Secondly, the apparatus of capture is primarily a semiological process 
(ATP 445). For Deleuze, every social formation is both a physical system 
(a manner of occupying space and time) and a ‘regime of signs’. In the 
codes of primitive societies, these signs were inscribed directly on the body 
in the form of markings (tattoos, circumcisions, incisions, scars, mutila-
tions and so on) that indicated one’s inclusion in the social  formation – an 
entire system of ‘mnemotechnics’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 144–5). If 
the ancient despotic state was able to overcode these existing codes, it was 
because it operated with an abstract and externalised semiotics based on 
numeracy, literacy and money: the development of geometry and arithme-
tic, the invention of phonetic writing and the issuing of currency. Money 
is an abstraction that functions as an abstract equivalent for goods and 
services. Geometry treats the earth as an abstract space in which all places 
are equivalent. Labour allows for a quantitative and abstract comparison 
of human activities. Taken together, these three heads of the apparatus 
of capture create an abstract locus of comparison in which land, goods, 
services, transactions and human activities are equalised, homogenised, 
compared, appropriated and stockpiled – all in a single process. In other 
words, the state operates by abstraction and is itself an abstraction (Sibertin-
Blanc 2013: 50).
Thirdly, the self-presupposing and abstract nature of the state entails a 
particular type of violence, one that is itself posited as pre-established and 
pre-accomplished, even if it must be reactivated every day. It is often said 
that the state has a monopoly on legitimate violence – violence against 
‘criminals’, violence against those who capture something they have no 
‘right’ to capture – which the state self-regulates through the institution of 
law. But this juridical coding of violence within the state takes place within 
the structural violence of the state itself, whose apparatus of capture simul-
taneously constitutes and presupposes a right to capture (ATP 448). The 
state, as self-presupposing, is itself a kind of originary or primary violence 
that is always-already present, even if it never actually ‘took place’ (see 
Derrida 2002). As such, it is first and foremost in myth that the primary 
violence of the state finds expression, retrojected in an original violence 
against chaos that, at the limit, never actually occurred, even if it is omni-
present in every mechanism of the state. Hence the appeal to Dumézil’s 
classic analyses of the two poles of sovereignty found in Indo-European 
myths: the jurist-kings who operate through law and a respect for obli-
gations, but also the terrifying magico-religious sovereign who operates 
through a magical capture that ‘binds without combat’ (Dumézil 1988: 
152; ATP 424–5). The originary violence of the state makes resistance 
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impossible, and it is what gives the state its power (puissance): territorial 
power (monopoly of the earth), economic power (monopoly of labour), 
monetary power (monopoly of currency) and, ultimately, political power 
(monopoly of violence).
II
The self-presupposing or self-producing nature of the state leads to a third 
thesis: the archaic state had no distinct cause that could explain its ‘origin’. 
The great archaeologist V. Gordon Childe proposed a well-known theory 
about the origin of the state (Childe 1951; 2009; cf. Lull and Mico 2011: 
180–9): at some point in prehistory, hunter-gatherer groups learned to 
cultivate grain and raise livestock (the Neolithic revolution), and it was 
this surplus of agricultural food that is supposed to have made the state 
possible, with its complex divisions of labour, large economic projects and 
intricate social organisation (the urban revolution) (ATP 428). In other 
words, primitive societies eventually reached a threshold in their ‘mode 
of production’ that allowed them to pass from an economy of subsistence 
to an economy of surplus. Using two complementary arguments, Deleuze 
and Guattari show that the evidence from archaeology, ethnography and 
even history does not support this theory.
The first argument comes from the analysis of primitive societies. Pierre 
Clastres, in his 1974 book Society Against the State (Clastres 1989; cf. 
Clastres 1994), had shown that the absence of a state in primitive soci-
eties is not a sign that they were ‘backward’ societies that had not yet 
evolved or developed enough. On the contrary, primitive societies are 
constituted by mechanisms that deliberately ward off the apparatus of 
the state, and actively prevent it from appearing. Clastres identified two 
such mechanisms: the role of chiefs, whose status constantly waxes and 
wanes, thereby preventing the resonance of power in a single despot; and 
the function of war, which maintained polemical relations of antagonism 
between segmentary lineages, preventing their convergence in a state appa-
ratus. Clastres had been influenced, in part, by Marshal Sahlins’s Stone Age 
Economics, which had shown that hunter-gatherers, far from living at a 
subsistence level requiring constant toil, were in fact the first affluent soci-
ety, where the quest for food was intermittent and leisure was abundant 
(Sahlins 1972; see Clastres 1994). The absence of a surplus did not indi-
cate an inability to develop technical means or overcome environmental 
obstacles, but was a positive goal, socially valorised. Even the innovations 
imported by colonialists were utilised, not to increase production but to 
reduce work time. Sahlins’s thesis was anticipated by Marcel Mauss, whose 
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1925 essay The Gift had already shown that the giving of gifts and counter-
gifts (potlatch) in primitive societies was a mechanism for warding off the 
accumulation of wealth (Mauss 1954: 3). In short, anthropologists have 
identified positive mechanisms in primitive societies that prevented the 
formation of a state apparatus: there is a refusal of the state’s apparatus of 
power as much as a refusal of markets and the economy. Primitive socie-
ties, like states, are ‘self-validating’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 203). If 
this claim is correct, it makes the appearance of the state even more diffi-
cult to explain. How could the state have evolved out of primitive hunter-
gatherer societies if these are societies whose very organisation is directed 
against the formation of the state (Sibertin-Blanc 2013: 22)?
The second argument comes from the analysis of the state. The urbanist 
Jane Jacobs, in the first chapter of her 1969 book The Economy of Cities, 
which is entitled ‘Cities First – Rural Development Later’, launched an 
attack on what she called ‘the dogma of agricultural primacy’ (Jacobs 
1970: 3). Jacobs, contentiously, attempted to invert this schema: it is the 
state that creates agriculture, she argued, and not the converse. She based 
her conclusions in part on James Mellaart’s discovery of Çatalhöyük, a 
‘proto-town’ in Turkey that dates back to Neolithic times (7000 bc – the 
date given to the thirteenth plateau), and perhaps even further, and which 
would thus have been in direct contact with hunter-gatherers. Jacobs sug-
gests that it was in such cities that seeds were first gathered, hybridised 
and finally planted, initially in the soil around the town, and then expand-
ing into the countryside. To explain (and exorcise) the prevalence of the 
‘agriculture first’ dogma, Jacobs draws an analogy with the technologies of 
electricity (Jacobs 1970: 46). Electricity was invented in cities, yet it is pri-
marily in rural areas that we find the massive installations needed for gen-
erating and transmitting electricity: dams, power plants, grids. If human 
memory did not extend back to a time when the world had cities but no 
electricity, the archaeological evidence could be interpreted to imply that, 
initially, there were rural people with no electricity, who then developed 
dams and power plants, eventually producing a large enough surplus of 
electricity to make cities possible. We are doing something similar when 
we claim that an agricultural surplus made the state possible, but the error 
is clear: we turn the results of state activity into a precondition for the state.
The French historian Fernand Braudel, in his Civilization and 
Capitalism, took up a modified version of Jacobs’s thesis, although he was 
writing in a different context, analysing the relation between the urban 
and the rural in fifteenth- to eighteenth-century Europe. Braudel likewise 
contested the dogma that the countryside ‘necessarily preceded the town 
in time’, but argued, not that cities preceded the countryside, but that the 
two were reciprocally determined. ‘Jane Jacobs, in a persuasive book, argues 
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that the town appears at least simultaneously with rural settlement, if not 
before it . . . Town and countryside obeyed the rule of “reciprocity of 
perspectives”: mutual creation, mutual domination, mutual exploitation 
according to the unchanging rules of co-existence’ (Braudel 1992: 484, 486: 
see also Smith, Ur and Feinman 2014: 1532: ‘Agriculture and urbanism 
. . . developed in tandem’). Building on his analysis of the apparatus of 
capture, Deleuze adopts a variant of Braudel’s thesis: not that the state 
preceded agriculture, but that agriculture and the state were co-determined.
It is the State that creates agriculture, animal raising, and metallurgy; it does 
so first on its own soil, then imposes them on the surrounding world . . . It 
is not the State that presupposes a mode of production, it is the State that 
makes production a ‘mode’. The last reasons for presuming a progressive 
development are invalidated. (ATP 429)
We return to the self-presupposing nature of the state: if the state stocks 
an agricultural surplus, it is because it itself creates the conditions that make 
a surplus possible.
Deleuze draws on this argument when he assesses Friedrich Engels’s 
famous 1884 book on the Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the 
State (Engels 1972). Engels appealed to several sets of factors to explain 
the origin of the state: exogenous factors, such as the need to organise 
wars; endogenous factors, such as the rise of private property and money; 
and specific factors, such as the emergence of ‘public functions’ (Deleuze 
1979a; cf. ATP 427). But Deleuze shows how each of these factors, far 
from explaining the emergence of the state, in fact presuppose an already-
existing state. States can and often do appropriate a war machine for 
themselves, but such an appropriation presupposes that the state already 
exists. Similarly, no one has ever indicated a mechanism through which 
one could move from a communal tribal property to private property, as if 
one day some exceptional person decided to proclaim, ‘This is mine.’ On 
the contrary, archaeology has been able to provide a precise mechanism, 
assignable if variable, showing how private property was constituted out of 
a system of imperial public property through freed slaves – but this means 
that the privatisation of property could become a characteristic of the state 
only if the public property of the archaic state were already given (ATP 
449, 451). The same is true for the origin of money, which was created not 
to promote commerce, but for the purposes of taxation, which likewise 
presupposed an already-existing state. Finally, public functions also pre-
suppose a state: irrigation, for instance, was an agricultural problem that 
went beyond the capacities of most agricultural communities.
These analyses all point to the same antinomy: on the one hand, the 
state could not have emerged from the soil of primitive societies, since 
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they are directed against the state; on the other hand, the factors typically 
put forward to explain the emergence of the state (agricultural surplus, 
the military, private property, money, public works) in fact presuppose an 
already-existing state. Every explanation of the origin of the state is tauto-
logical, presuming what it seeks to explain. How then can we explain the 
appearance of the state’s apparatus of capture, if it was not the result of a 
progressive evolutionary process, and if it ‘leads back to no distinct assign-
able cause’ (ATP 427)? Deleuze draws the only possible conclusion: the 
state appeared in the world fully formed and fully armed, as if it were born 
an adult, ‘a master stroke executed all at once [coup de maître en une fois]’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 217; cf. ATP 427). But what does it mean to 
say that the state appeared in the world ‘fully formed’?
III
The question of the origin of the state can be posed as both a de facto 
and a de jure problem. Even if one grants that the state did not evolve 
from primitive societies, but was a ‘master stroke executed all at once’, 
one could still (and legitimately) attempt to search for the first state. Such 
a search would be complicated by the fact that the criterion for identify-
ing a state or proto-urban formation is not a matter of population or size, 
since ‘primitive accumulation’ occurs whenever there is an apparatus of 
capture. ‘It is enough for this point of comparison and appropriation to be 
effectively occupied for the apparatus of capture to function’ (ATP 447). 
But archaeology has continued to push back in time the appearance of the 
first state, and no doubt it will continue to do so. As Leroi-Gourhan once 
observed, ‘while we may expect to discover evidence of ever older semi-
urbanised units going back to the very beginnings of proto-agriculture, 
the first city will probably never be found’ (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 171). 
As such, the search for the first state is a kind of passage to the limit, and 
this limit is the point where the question ceases to be a quantitative and 
de facto question of regression in time, and instead becomes a qualitative 
and de jure question (ATP 428): the de facto problem of chronological 
succession becomes a de jure problem of topological coexistence. If ‘the self-
sufficiency, autarky, independence, and preexistence of primitive commu-
nities is an ethnological dream’ (ATP 429), it is because primitive societies 
and states have always and everywhere coexisted with each other.
The quid juris question then becomes that of the relations of coexist-
ence between social formations. Yet if the various social formations ana-
lysed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia do not represent the evolutionary 
stages of social development, neither can they simply be identified as the 
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ideal types of a comparative sociology, despite appearances, since each type 
functions in a different manner (Silbertin-Blanc 2010b: 114). The concept 
of the ‘primitive’, for instance, can be seen as a type whose unity is the 
unity of reason, theoretically subsuming under a single concept a plural-
ity of heterogeneous societies. By contrast, the capitalist type has a unity 
that is not only theoretical but also historical: it is a singular universal, in 
the sense that it is the result of a historically contingent process that has 
resulted in the universalisation of its singularity. But Deleuze and Guattari 
ascribe to the state a unity of a completely different nature: a real unity 
that, whether actualised or virtual, is omnipresent throughout the entire 
social field, not only in archaic states or modern nation-states, but even in 
primitive societies ‘without a state’.
This brings us to Deleuze and Guattari’s fourth thesis: there has never 
been but one state, a thesis that is repeated throughout Anti-Oedipus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 214, 220, 261) and taken up in A Thousand 
Plateaus. To be sure, Deleuze and Guattari readily admit that in fact 
there are a plurality of states, and that modern states are very different 
from the archaic imperial state. But these de facto differences between 
concrete states find their de jure ground in the ideality of a single state 
(pluralism = monism), which Deleuze and Guattari call the Urstaat (ur- 
[proto] + staat [state]). The Urstaat is both a limit-concept and an Idea, 
in the Deleuzian sense. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the general theory of 
society is a generalised theory of flows’ or fluxes (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 262), and the function of social formations is to code these fluxes. 
The Idea of the Urstaat, in turn, lies at the opposite pole of the Idea of 
a pure flux (schizophrenia): it is the Idea of a completely captured and 
coded flow, which is ‘the eternal model of everything the State wants to 
be and desires’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 217). Thus, the Urstaat must 
not be confused with the archaic imperial state, which simply actualises 
the Urstaat in its ‘purest conditions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 198). 
Rather, the Urstaat is ‘THE abstraction, which is realised, certainly, in 
imperial  formations . . . but takes on its concrete immanent existence in 
subsequent forms that make it reappear in other figures and under other 
conditions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 221).
The theory of the Urstaat must be read, in part, as Deleuze and 
Guattari’s contribution to the Marxist debates surrounding the status of 
the ‘Asiatic mode of production’, which Marx saw as an original mode 
of production that was reducible to neither the ancient slave mode of 
production nor the feudal mode of production (see Godelier 1978; Tokei 
1979; Anderson 1979). Marx introduced the concept in the Grundrisse 
(Marx 1965: 69–70), referring primarily to India and China, but he 
abandoned it in Capital, and Engels renounced it in The Origin of the 
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Family, Private Property, and the State. During the Stalinist period, it 
was officially rejected in favour of Marx’s theory of five stages (primi-
tive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism) in which the 
Asiatic mode of production finds no place (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 
219). But the debates never subsided. Is the Asiatic mode of production 
a weak hypothesis that Marx renounced after his reading of Morgan, 
as Plekhanov suggested (Plekhanov 1992)? If not, is it an autonomous 
mode of production? Or simply a ‘pseudo-feudal’ formation, a transition 
between the primitive communist mode and the ancient mode of slavery? 
Or is it the embryonic form of an ancient mode of production that was 
‘blocked’ at a ‘phase prior to the evolution of slavery’, as Stalin argued, 
laying down the position that would dominate Soviet Marxism (Stalin 
1940)? What Deleuze and Guattari derive from these debates is an exten-
sion of the position adopted by Karl Wittfogel in his 1957 book Oriental 
Despotism. Like Trotsky and Bukharin before him, Wittfogel, himself an 
ambiguous figure (Ulman 1978), likened Stalin to an Eastern potentate 
and saw his regime as a species of Oriental despotism, embodying the 
worst aspects of the Asiatic mode of production. In a sense, Deleuze and 
Guattari agreed: ‘We have to go along with Wittfogel when he shows the 
degree to which modern capitalist and socialist States take on the char-
acteristic features of the primordial despotic State’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 229; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 219n). But they pushed the 
point further than Wittfogel: they argued that it is not simply modern 
totalitarian states that resurrect the Urstaat; rather, every type of state, 
whether totalitarian or fascist, democratic or capitalist, is a resurrection 
of the ideal Urstaat. ‘“Asiatic” production, with the State that expresses 
or constitutes its objective movement, is not a distinct formation; it is the 
basic formation, on the horizon throughout history’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 217).
The Urstaat addresses several results of Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis 
of the state: the fact that a genesis of the state-form is impossible, since it 
is self-presupposing and has no ‘cause’; the fact that the historical begin-
nings of the state are unassignable; and finally, the fact that the Urstaat 
cannot be identified with its material manifestations. In one of his few 
affirmations of Hegelianism, Deleuze writes: ‘If there is even one truth in 
the political philosophy of Hegel, it is that every State carries within itself 
the essential moments of its existence’ (ATP 385; cf. 460). The ‘essential’ 
moment is the ideal moment of magical capture, but the Urstaat is mate-
rialised in a long history of mutations, and as such, it marks the point 
where the traditional alternative between Hegelian idealism and Marxist 
materialism becomes undecidable (Sibertin-Blanc 2013: 19, 29). It is for 
this reason that the Urstaat
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appears to be set back at a remove from what it transects and from what 
it resects, as though it were giving evidence of another dimension, a cer-
ebral ideality [in the Platonic sense] that is superimposed on the material 
evolution of societies, a regulating idea [in the Kantian sense] or principle 
of reflection (terror) that organises the fluxes into a whole. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983: 219)
But the Urstaat is an Idea in the Deleuzian sense: it is an immemorial Idea, 
a past that has never been given as such (second synthesis). If there is but 
one state, it is because the Urstaat is a virtuality or basin of attraction that 
permeates the entire social field as its foundation or ground (fondement), 
even though it cannot be identified with any of its actualisations.
IV
But the theory of the Urstaat confronts an obvious problem with regard to 
primitive societies. How can one claim that the Urstaat is present through-
out the social field, even in primitive societies, if such societies actively 
ward off the state? This leads us to Deleuze and Guattari’s fifth thesis: the 
Urstaat was active ‘before’ its existence. If primitive societies warded off the 
state, they must have had a ‘presentiment’ of the state as the actual limit 
they are avoiding – a limit they could not reach without self-destructing. 
The manner in which the Urstaat is actualised in historical states, in other 
words, is different from the manner in which the Urstaat pre-exists as a 
warded-off limit in primitive societies. Objectively, Deleuze and Guattari 
initially explain this phenomenon from a model drawn from physics. If 
one considers the social field as a field of vectors, one could say that primi-
tive societies are traversed by a centripetal wave that converges on a point 
x – a point where the wave would cancel itself out and be inverted into 
a divergent and centrifugal wave, which is a reality of another order (the 
state) (ATP 565 n.14). The point of convergence marks a potential or a 
threshold of consistency, and the convergent wave has the double property of 
both anticipating it and warding it off. The state is thus ‘beyond’ primitive 
groups, but ‘beyond’ does not mean ‘after’. The threshold of consistency 
has always existed, but it is beyond the limit of primitive societies, which 
are content to keep that threshold at a distance. We must thus conceptual-
ise the coexistence or contemporaneousness of these two inverse movements, 
‘as if the two waves that seem to us to exclude or succeed each other 
unfolded simultaneously in an “archaeological”, micropolitical, micrologi-
cal, molecular field’ (ATP 431).
But there is a second issue that comes to the fore here, which is more 
subjective. Since every exchange of objects requires a way in which one can 
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compare the objects of exchange, no political economist can avoid the ques-
tion, how should one evaluate the criteria of exchange? Responding to this 
question requires a theory of collective evaluations, or what one might call, 
in a Kantian vein, ‘anticipations of social perception’ (Deleuze 1979c). In 
the Marxist theory of labour-value, the way to compare exchanged objects 
– for instance, an iron axe and a steel axe – is to compare the labour time 
that is socially necessary for their production, which requires a collective 
evaluation of both the worker and the entrepreneur using a scientific (or 
pseudo-scientific) form of quantification. In primitive societies, however, 
this route is closed off in advance, not because a measure is lacking, but 
because there is no ‘labour time’ to be measured. Human activity is in 
constant variation, and there is nothing that corresponds to labour, much 
less to labour time.
On this score, Deleuze appeals to the nineteenth-century neoclassi-
cal theory of marginalism, which was originally invented to account for 
the equilibrium of prices within the capitalist regime. If Marx held to the 
classical theory in which the value of commodities is derived from the 
quantity of labour required to produce them, marginalists like Stanley 
Jevons argued that value should instead be analysed in terms of the utility 
of the ‘last’ or ‘marginal’ object (Clarke 1982: 147–50). Business owners 
know that, beyond a certain limit, the structure of their business will have 
to change: there are thresholds beyond which an ‘assemblage’ (agencement) 
cannot maintain its current consistency. For example, how many cows 
can a dairy farmer purchase without making any changes to his business, 
such as adding acreage or procuring more equipment? The last cow he 
could currently buy is the ‘marginal object’, since if he purchases more, 
he will have to fundamentally alter the size and structure of his business. 
More importantly, it is his anticipation of the last or marginal cow that 
determines the price he is willing to pay for the cows he currently needs. 
If his business can only sustain twenty additional cows, he will not buy 
fifty, even if their price is substantially discounted. In marginalism, it is the 
evaluation of the idea of the last or ‘marginal’ object that determines the 
value of the entire series of real terms.
Although Deleuze finds marginalism weak as a general economic 
theory, he finds a new field of application for a modified marginalism in 
non-capitalist formations (ATP 437). In primitive societies, he argues, 
the object of collective evaluation is not labour time, but rather the idea 
of the last object or marginal object that governs the series of exchanges, 
and agriculture is incapable of entering into these serial schemas. We can 
thus conceptualises a difference between the ‘limit’ and the ‘threshold’: 
in a collective evaluation, what is anticipated is the limit (the penultimate 
exchange, which allows one to remain in the same assemblage) but what is 
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warded off is the threshold (which would force one to change assemblage). 
‘It is the evaluation of the last as limit that constitutes an anticipation and 
simultaneously wards off the last as threshold or ultimate (a new agence-
ment)’ (ATP 439). The threshold marks the point where stockpiling would 
begin, and the temporal succession of territories would be replaced by the 
spatial coexistence and exploitation of different territories: the apparatus 
of capture.
V
Though the state was not formed by an evolution but appeared in a single 
stroke, Deleuze and Guattari nonetheless point to an inevitable and inter-
nal ‘becoming’ or mutation of the state-form. The principle of this muta-
tion comes from the same process of overcoding and capture that defines 
the archaic state, but functions as its supplementary double: the archaic 
state cannot overcode and capture without at the same time freeing up 
a large quantity of decoded flows that escape from it. It cannot create 
large-scale public works without a flow of independent labour escaping 
from its hierarchised bureaucracy of functionaries, notably in the mines 
and in metallurgy. It cannot create coinage without flows of money escap-
ing, and nourishing or giving birth to other powers (notably in commerce 
and banking). It cannot create a system of public property without a flow 
of private appropriation growing up beside it, and then starting to slip 
through its fingers. Finally, it is with the rise of private property that classes 
appear, since the dominant classes are no longer part of the state apparatus, 
but become distinct determinations that make use of a now-transformed 
apparatus.
This is Deleuze and Guattari’s sixth thesis: in a multitude of forms, 
the apparatus of overcoding inevitably gives rise to decoded flows that escape 
the apparatus of capture – flows of money, flows of labour, flows of prop-
erty, flows of population (ATP 449; Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 223). If 
the first great movement of deterritorialisation appears in the overcoding 
performed by the despotic state, the second movement appears in the 
decoding of the flows that are set in motion by the despotic state’s own 
apparatus of capture. This is the ‘paranoid’ vector that is inherent in the 
state-form (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 193): the state is at once capture 
and the impossibility of complete capture, since the state can only over-
code by decoding (abstraction). The state cannot presuppose itself without 
also presupposing what escapes its form of interiority, namely, decoded 
flows, which are the figure of the ‘outside’ (dehors) of the state, the inverse 
of its Idea. Just as the state creates what it captures, it creates what escapes 
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its apparatus of capture: it is the state’s form of interiority (capture) that at 
the same time creates the state’s absolute outside (decoded flows).
It is this situation that initially gives rise to a diverse variety of state-
forms – ‘evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies’ 
(ATP 459) – all of which will have as their aim the recoding, by means 
of regular or exceptional topical operations, of the products of these 
decoded flows. For example, the ancient Mediterranean world (Pelagians, 
Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians) created an urban fabric that was dis-
tinct from the archaic imperial states. Both states and cities are social for-
mations that ‘deterritorialise’ their surrounding rural territories, but cities 
accomplish this deterritorialisation in a very different manner than states. 
The state is a phenomenon of intraconsistency that captures territories by 
relating them to a superior arithmetic unity (the despot), by subordinating 
them to a transcendent or mythic order imposed upon them from above. 
Cities, by contrast, are phenomena of transconsistency that bring about an 
immanent deterritorialisation that adapts the surrounding territories to a 
geometrical extension in which the city itself is merely a relay-point in a 
vast network of commercial and maritime circuits. The power of the city 
does not lie above but in the middle; it exists only as a function of circu-
lation, and is a correlate of the road. As such, the city is a singular point 
through which commerce enters and exits; it is an instrument of polarisa-
tion rather than an apparatus of capture: ‘it effects a polarisation of matter 
– inert, living or human’ (ATP 432). Whatever the flow involved it must 
be deterritorialised to enter the network, to submit to the polarisation, to 
follow the circuit of urban and road recoding.
Nonetheless, it was the decoding power of the state-form – and not the 
city-form – that would ultimately lead to the rise of capitalism. If the state 
appears fully formed on the horizon of history, capitalism appears only 
after a long succession of contingent events and encounters. Anti-Oedipus 
provides an analysis of the formation of capitalism, which is similarly 
defined by a process of decoding and recoding, and it addresses the ques-
tion posed by historians such as Braudel (Braudel 1973: 308) and Balazs 
(Balazs 1964: 34–54): Why was capitalism born in Europe rather than, 
say, in Rome or thirteenth-century China, when all the conditions for it 
were present but not effectuated (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 197, 224). 
What A Thousand Plateaus adds to this is an analysis of the new status the 
state assumes within capitalism as a model of realisation (a term that does 
not appear in Anti-Oedipus). Although it is the state that produces capital-
ism, capitalism in turn transforms and subsumes the state (Holland 2013: 
131–5). As Marx showed, capitalism appears when the generalised decod-
ing of flows set loose by the state reaches a threshold of consistency that 
allows two of these unqualified flows – abstract capital and naked labour 
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– to conjugate in a differential relation. These flows are ‘unqualified’ or 
unspecified because, in and of themselves, they have no content: labour 
can produce a myriad of commodities or services that capital can purchase, 
but the nature of these products is not qualified in advance (a commodity 
is a qualified product of a quantity of labour). If the ancient despotic state 
operated with an abstract semiotics (writing, geometry, money) that was 
capable of overcoding existing codes, capitalism required for its function-
ing a new form of abstraction – a new ‘regime of signs’ – capable of deal-
ing with unqualified flows that have no specifiable content. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s seventh thesis is that it is only axiomatics that can play such a 
role.
VI
But by what right can capitalism be compared with a mathematical notion 
as precise as axiomatics? In his seminars, Deleuze distinguishes between 
logical formalisation and axiomatics, which are related but not identical 
(Deleuze 1980b). The difference is that a logical formalisation is a system 
of formal relations between specified or specifiable elements, whereas an 
axiomatic is a system of functional relations between non-specified ele-
ments. Though they have ancient roots, both procedures were given a 
rigorous status at roughly the same time by Russell (formalisation) and 
Hilbert (axiomatics). Russell, in response to the self-referential paradoxes 
generated by set theory (e.g. the barber paradox), had proposed his famous 
theory of types, which is a formalisation based on the principle that a set 
cannot contain itself as an element. The theory establishes a hierarchy of 
types, and holds that objects of a given type must be constructed exclu-
sively of objects of a preceding type, lower in the hierarchy. Although 
antiquity was aware of similar paradoxes, such as the liar paradox, it had 
made no attempt to provide a formalised remedy such as Russell’s. Yet 
it is not anachronistic to think of Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the 
state in terms of logical formalism, as if this formalism was already present 
socially without being formalised theoretically. The claim that the archaic 
state overcodes agricultural communities means that the ‘apparatus of 
capture’ is of a different type than the ‘agricultural communities’. We find 
here a logical confirmation of the preceding analyses: the state cannot be 
an agricultural community; rather, the state is a model to be realised, a 
model that transcends the agricultural communities and creates its own 
ground.
Axiomatisation differs from logical formalisation and has a distinct 
historical trajectory. In the late nineteenth century, both mathematics 
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and capitalism confronted a crisis in the foundations. In mathematics, the 
lack of ‘clear and rigorous’ foundations, particularly for the calculus, led 
Hilbert to propose a programme to ground mathematics in a finite set of 
axioms – a project that the Bourbaki group in France, starting in 1935, 
pursued in a series of works entitled Éléments de mathématique. At the 
same time, capitalism was provoking a parallel crisis in the socio-economic 
realm: its generalised decoding of fluxes had led to a collapse of the foun-
dation that had once been provided by the state. The monetary mass of 
capital is a continuous or intensive quantity that increases and decreases 
without being controlled or mastered by any agency. In both capitalism 
and mathematics, when the foundation collapsed, it was axiomatisation 
that took over: the foundation was now provided by a set of axioms. The 
axioms of capital are ‘operative statements that constitute the semiological 
form of Capital and that enter as component parts into assemblages of 
production, circulation, and consumption’ (ATP 461) – such as legisla-
tive, regulative or financial statements: banking legislation, public spend-
ing, wage regulation, property laws, human rights statutes and so on. 
These axioms deal not only with flows of capital (finance), but also with 
flows of commodities (markets), flows of population (migrants, unions, 
employment), and flows of matter-energy (oil, gas, electricity). Deleuze 
even suggests that ultimately ‘the true axiomatic is social and not scientific’ 
(Deleuze 1972).
The status of the state has changed accordingly. Modern nation-states 
are still actualisations of the Urstaat, with its Idea of a completely coded 
flux, but one could say that the concept of a ‘model’ has altered: the state 
is no longer a transcendent model to be realised, but an immanent model 
of realisation for the axiomatic of capitalism. In model theory, models are 
the heterogeneous structures or domains in which an axiomatic is real-
ised. Within capitalism, there is a genuine heterogeneity of state-forms – 
democratic, socialist, communist, totalitarian, despotic – but each of these 
forms is isomorphic in relation to a single global capitalist market (ATP 
464). Nation-states differ primarily in the way that they master the flows 
(ATP 262), either through a multiplication of directing axioms (social 
democracies) or a subtraction or withdrawal of axioms (totalitarianism). 
Axiomatics is sometimes seen as a kind of ‘automation’ of thought, but 
in reality it should be seen as a specific mode of experimentation, since 
no one can say in advance what axioms should be chosen, or whether an 
axiomatic will be consistent. From the viewpoint of its axiomatics, the his-
tory of politics can be seen as a history of constant and often decisive errors 
(ATP 461). The ‘Apparatus of Capture’ plateau concludes with a detailed 
analysis of the contemporary nature of the capitalist axiomatic – including 
analyses of what exceeds the axiomatic, such as the power of the continuum 
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(the war machine) and non-denumerable multiplicities (minorities) (ATP 
460–73).
VII
How, finally, are we to understand the claim that social change takes 
place within a field of coexistence? Deleuze and Guattari give their response 
to this question in their final thesis, which recapitulates the others and 
constitutes the principle of their critique of social evolution: ‘All history 
does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession’ (ATP 430; cf. 
Lundy 2012). This thesis allows us to distinguish three levels of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s sociopolitical philosophy, which begins with types, then 
evaluates their powers, and finally maps out their becomings. At the first 
level, Anti-Oedipus initially presents us with a typology of social forma-
tions, and these ‘types’ can be understood in a Bergsonian manner. In 
Matter and Memory, Bergson created his well-known concepts of ‘pure 
memory’ and ‘pure perception’: although perception and memory are 
always mixed together in experience (de facto), these concepts allowed 
him to distinguish (de jure) the differences in nature between the two lines 
or ‘tendencies’ of pure memory and pure perception. The same is true for 
Deleuze and Guattari’s typology of social formations. Although each type 
in fact coexists with the others within a single field of coexistence – in our 
contemporary situation, states, war machines and archaic territorialities all 
coexist within the capitalist axiomatic – each concept is a tool that allows 
one to demarcate distinctions or differences in kind within the social mul-
tiplicity (Bogue 2004: 172–3).
At a second level, however, A Thousand Plateaus characterises each of 
these types in terms of a specific ‘machinic process’: primitive societies are 
characterised by mechanisms of anticipation/prevention; states are charac-
terised by apparatuses of capture; nomadic war machines, by the occupa-
tion of smooth space; cities, by instruments of polarisation; ecumenical 
organisations, by the encompassment of heterogeneous formations; capi-
talism, by decoding/axiomatisation. This is no longer a question of types; 
rather, each of these processes is a power (puissance) that indicates a certain 
capacity or capability of a social formation. Primitive societies anticipate 
and ward off, archaic states capture: this is what they ‘can do’, what they are 
capable of. In a Spinozistic manner, each of these powers or processes must 
be grasped positively as a determinate quantity of reality (see Sibertin-Blanc 
2013: 41–6). The problem with evolutionary schemas is that they tend to 
view social formations through the prism of the state-form, which leads 
to the litany of ‘societies without’ – ‘without a state’, ‘without history’, 
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‘without writing.’ But this focus on the state-form winds up assigning 
privation and lack to other formations, severing them from the forms of 
power that each of them affirms positively. The second level takes us from 
Bergson to Spinoza: beneath the categorial typology of social formations, 
one finds an ethological map of their constitutive powers, ‘a logic of coes-
sential positivities and coexisting affirmations’ (Deleuze 1988: 95).
But the third level is uniquely Deleuzo-Guattarian. Far from being 
governed by a single form of power, every social formation, both in fact 
and in principle, is composed of a plurality of processes that are in ‘per-
petual interaction’ with each other (ATP 430), and each process can func-
tion at a ‘power’ other than its own. Anticipation-prevention mechanisms, 
for instance, ‘are at work not only in primitive societies, but are trans-
ferred into Cities that ward off the state-form, into the state that wards off 
capitalism, and into capitalism itself, which wards off and repels its own 
limits’ (ATP 437). Similarly, the state is able to capture, not only land, 
activity and exchange, but also the anticipation-prevention mechanisms 
themselves, as well as the war machine and instruments of polarisation. 
And the powers ‘become’ something other when they enter into relations 
with each other: the power of the war machine changes nature when it is 
‘appropriated’ by the state, just as the state’s apparatus of capture changes 
nature when it is subordinated to the worldwide capitalist market. This is 
the sense of the term ‘becoming’: it is what takes place between two mul-
tiplicities, changing their nature. What appears in evolutionary theories 
as a chronological succession is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a phenomenon 
of transfer or transport between becomings. In each case, one must ask: 
What is a social formation capable of? What can it tolerate or support? 
What are the processes that exceed its capacities for reproduction, and put 
it in question? When does it pass its limit and enter into a new threshold 
of consistency? How does it become? Thus, we have to say that the term 
‘field of coexistence’ does not refer to an external and de facto coexistence 
of social formations in a historical space-time, but rather to an intrinsic 
and de jure coexistence of powers and processes in a non-historical space-
time, a continuum in which divergent temporalities coexist. This is what 
Deleuze calls the ‘plane of immanence’, a field where all the powers of 
the social machine coexist virtually, in constant becoming, enveloped and 
implicated in each other in ‘a topological space and a stratigraphic time’ 
(Lapoujade 2014: 218).
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